Home / Lectures / Massimo Warglien, University of Venice

Mental Models of Strategic Interactions

Massimo Warglien, University of Venice

Description

Semester:

  • Winter 1999

Speakers:

Massimo Warglien, Department of Economics, University of Venice

Lecture Time:

Fri, January 8, 1999 @ 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm

Lecture Location:

Room 4212, School of Education

Speaker Webpage(s):

http://venus.unive.it/warglien/home/

Introduced By:

No introduction available.

Abstract

Game theory has been developing over years a set of powerful tools for representing the microstructure of interaction. Such game representations are increasingly employed to analyze basic issues of interaction in organizations. Examples include: coordination failures, cooperation dilemmas, the effectiveness of alternative incentive schemes, delegation, career mechanisms, strategic manipulation of information, trust, standardization processes.

The talk addresses the following question: are game representations plausible approximations of how individuals represent in their mind basic forms of interaction with others? The talk presents laboratory experimental evidence suggesting that this may not be the case. Even when explicitly provided with game representations of the interaction, individuals form mental models of the interaction which are partial, local, and often non-strategic.

By partial I mean that not all possible contingencies are represented in individuals’ minds. By local I mean that individuals fail to integrate information. By non-strategic, I mean that individuals fail to consider other players’ motivations.

Some regularities in the way individuals shape their representations of interaction suggest connections with the theory of mental models in the psychology of reasoning and with some basic evidence on language understanding.

Some basic implications for organizational research are outlined.

Recording & Additional Notes

No recordings available.

Introducer: Rebecca Wells, School of Public Health